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Federal Reserve  System.In this  paper,  I  examjne  a burgeon'ing  literature  on the behavior
of unregulated  banking  systems. Its  analysis  of banking  and  money  has  been
dubbed  the legal restrictions  theory.  lt4any  of the theory's conclusions  are
startling,  as, for example,  the proposition  that it  is unnecessary  to
control the quantjty of depository  liabilities  in a competitive  banking
system. Sjmilarly, the theoryrs  mode  of analysis  is unconventional;  for
example,  its  benchmark  for examining  the nature  of banking  services  is a
nonmonetary  economy.  It  is precisely its  unconventional  analysis and
startling conclusions,  however,  which  make  the 1ega1  restrictions theory
both stimulating and  worth further cons'ideration.
In what  fol1ows,  I  fjrst  explicate the new  view  on banking;  I  next
consider  implications  of the new  view  fon controlling economjc
fluctuations; I  then present  a critique and, finally,  I  suggest  how  some  of
the vaiuable  insights of the 1ega1  restrjctions theory  mjght  be integrated
with impol'tant  tenets of more  traditional  approaches  to money  and  bank'ing.1
The  Legal  Restric!ions  Theory  of Money
The  legal restrictions theory examines  the seeming  paradox  that
individuals simultaneously  hold government  currency  and  government  bonds
The  currency  is  noninterest  bearing,  while government  bonds  bear interest.
The  paradoxical  aspect  of this behavion  derives from  the fact that both
obligations are default-free iiabilitjes  of the same  issuen.  Assuming
rational behavior  by transactors,  we  would  expect  the interest-bearing
securities to dominate  currency. Accordingly,  Wallace  (1983,  p,1)L
investjgates  the features  of interest-bearing  government  securitjes t,that
prevent  them  from  playing the same  l"ole  in transactions  as Federal  Reserve
notes.  For if  they could  play that ro1e, then it  is hard  to see  \rhy  anyone
would  hold non-jnterest-bearing  currency  instead  of the interest-bearing
securities.'r  The  new  view  identifies  1egal  restrictions as the source  of
the sjmultaneous  demand  for both currency  and  bonds  and  contrasts  the
current environment  with an unregulated  or rrlaissez-faire  system.'r  lr/allace
(1983,  p. 4) states the view  forceful  ly and  conciseiy.
...Laissez-fajre means  the absence  of 1ega1
restrictions that tend, among  other things, to
enhance  the demand  for a governmentrs  currency,
Thus,  the impositjon  of  laissez-faire would  almost
certainly reduce  the demand  for government
currency.  It  could  even  reduce  it  to zero.  A
zero demand  for a governmentrs  cur"rency  should  be
interpreted  as the abandonment  of one  monetary
unit  in favor of another  --  for example.  the
abandonment  of lhe dollar  in favor of one  ounce  of
go1d. Thus,  my  prediction of the effects of
imposing  laissez-fajre takes  the form  of an
either/or  statement:  either nominal  interest rates
go Lo zero or existing government  currency  becomes
worth  I  ess.
Wal  lace (1983,  p. 1) identifies two  conditions,  the presence  of
one  of which  is necessary  in order that government  bonds  not be
substitutable  fo" .u""ency.2  Either the bond  must  be nonnegotjable  (as is
tnue  of U.S. savings  bonds)  or not issued  in small  denomjnatjons  (as is
true of Treasury  bi  1  1  s)  .  As  Wal  I  ace  (  1983,  pp. 2-3) further observes,
neither of these  two restrjctions  by themse'lves  could  prevent  arbitrage by3
fjnancial intermediarjes. These  intermediaries  could  purchase  large
denomination,  negotiable  bonds  (i.e.,  Treasury  bilis  in multiples of
$10,000)  and  jssue bearer  notes  in smalI  denominations.  By  matching
maturities of these  notes  and  those  of the  Treasury  bills,  the
intermediary  would  be perfectly hedged. Since  its  assets  are default-free
by assumption,  its  bearer  notes  would  also be default-free (fraud aside).
Wallace  thus identifies a crucial leqal restriction  that is sufficien! for
the coexistence  of currency  and  bonds:  government  is a monopolistjc
provider of cu  rre  n  cy.
Absent  1ega1  restrictions,  arbitrage would  drive down  the yield
djfferential  between  bonds  and  currency  to the costs of intermediating
between  them. l/lallace  (1983,  pp. 3-4) estimates  that these  might  be less
than one  percent.  As an approximation,  one  could ignore  the difference.
Accordingly,  Wallace  concludes  that either interest rates on bonds  are
driven to zero or currency  disappears.
Another  way  of statjng the conclusion  is that money  would  not
exist as a distinct  financial asset.3  Thjs restatement  brings into sharper
rel ief  the clear connection  betlreen  Wal  lace's statement  of the legal
restrictions theory  and  Fischer  Black's earlier  analysis  of how  an
unregulated  financial system  would  operate.4 Black  assunes  that depository
institutions  have  complete  freedom  to create ljabjlities  and  to purchase
financial assets  as they see  fit.5  Banks'  income  derives from  the spread
between  their  borrowjng  costs --  chiefiy interest on  deposit liabilities  --
and  their  revenue  --  chief1y interest on loans.  Black  envis'ions  that loans
wi'l  I take the form  of negative  bank  balances,  or,  in other words,+
overdrafts  on deposit accounts. Indeed,  h'i  s description of the
hypothetical  system  of positjve and  negative  bank  balances  r  eads  like  a
virtual  foretel  ling of the modern  cash  management  account  at brokerage
houses  (B1ack  [1970], pp. 10-11).
B'lack  presents  an evolutionary  model  of financial innovation,
which  begins  with a commodity  money  and  ends  in a money'less  wor1d.  Early
in the evolutionary  process  real goods,  as well as the commodity  money,
become  priced in lerms  of an abstract unjt of account. Biack  hypothesizes,
however,  that the means  of payment  will  likely  be a portfol  io of common
stocks.  He  thereby  invokes  an assumption  that characterizes  subsequent
presentatjons  of the new  vjew: the separation  of the means  of payment  and
the unit of account.
Black  (1970,  p. 9) is also responsible  for first  articulating
another  characteristjc proposition  of the 1ega1  restrictions theory: in a
deregulated  financial environment,  I'it would  not be possib1e  to give any
neasonable  definition  of the quantity of money. The  payments  mechanism  in
such  a world  would  be very efficient,  but money  in the usual sense  would
not exist.rr" In other words,  having  merged  money  and  other financial
assets, Black  cannot  readily quantify the formen  separately.
Wallace  (1983,  p.a) takes  a different  tack and  anaiyzes
open-market  purchases  and  sales of Treasury  biIls  by a central bank  in a
laissez faire  regime.  He  assumes  that there is a constant-cost  technoiogy
for producing  currency,  whjch  is  shared  by private and  government
intermediaries  (a situation of rrtechnological  symmetry'r).  In other words,
g0vernment  and  private notes  are perfect subst'itutes  produced  under5
identical cost condjtions.  In l;lal  lacers example,  there i  s a given
private-sector demand  for currency.  Thus,  an expansion  in the production
of one  type of curr"ency  results jn the contraction  of other types.  An
open-market  purchase  of bills  by the central banks  constitutes just  such  a
change. As the central bank  increases  its  assets  (Treasury  b'i  lls),  it  will
issue  more  liabilities  (including currency).  Sjnce  indjviduals now  hold
central bank  currency,  they will  curtai  I  their demand  for commercial  bank
currency.  In the process,  resources  are reallocated from  pl-ivate-  to
publ  ic-sector pnoducers  of currency.  Wa'l  lace (1983,  pp. 4-5) concl  udes
that:
.  .  .  Under  Lai  ssez-fa  ire and  technol  ogi  cal symmetry,
the open  market  purchase  does  no  more  than change
the location from  the private sector to the
government  of a given quant'ity  of economic
activity,  the production  of smal  l-denomination
notes.  Nothing  else is affected, neither interest
rates nor the price Ievel nor the Ievel of
economic  actjvity.  A similar argument  applies  to .,
open  market,  sa1es.  '
In a laissez faire  system,  then, there are no  macroeconomic
effects of banks'  issuing their  own  I  iabilities  to purchase  financial
assets.  Th'i  s conc'lusjon,  which  holds  for central banks  and  private
i  ssuers  al  i  ke, i  s i  n starl  j  ng contrast to conventi  onal wi  sdom  and
constilutes the most  important  policy conclusion  of the 1ega1  restrjctjons
theory.  The  contention  will  be lhe focus of most  of the rest of the
DaDer.0nce  again, Black  suggests  how  a laissez faire  banking  system
might  operate.  The  world js a far cry from  a monetarist  environment
containing  a wel  l-defined transactjon  money,  h,hose  Lota'l  quantity js
linked to an exogenous  monetary  base  by a stable money  multiplier.  In
Black's  wor'ld,  debits and  credits would  be created  and  extinguished  with
every  transactjon.  In terms  of Wallacers  example,  under  competitiVe
conditions  expansion  by one  intermediary  would  come  at the expense  of
contraction  by others.  Both  analyses  conclude  that,  in a lajssez faire
system,  the provision of payment  services  by banks  would  have  no special
effects on prices or output (Cf. Fama  [1980], pp. 45-47).
Fconomjsts  traditionally  model  banks  as creators of money.
Certain  liabilities  of private banks  are added  to those  of central banks
with the resulting magnitude  constituting the money  stock.  The
money-creation  function is the benchmark  for analyzing  banks;  of course,
'i  n creating money  banks  are also providing the payments  senvices  on  which
legal restrictions theori  sts concentrate. In the latter  view, however,
banks  as creators of money  are peculiar to a regime  of legal restrictions.
Consequently,  conventional  monetary  theories are applicable  only to a
specific set of institutions.  The  1ega1  restrictions theory lays claim to
being  a more  general  theory  of financjal  intermediation.  Moreover,  by
abstracting  from  banks' role as creators of money  in a regulated  system,
1ega1  restriction  theorjsts feel that they better understand  the nature  of
banking  servjces.  0r,  as Fama  (1980,  p.42)  phrases  it,  "the banking
system  is best understood  without the mischief introduced  by the concept
of money." Legal  restriction  theorists focus instead  on the accounting
and  portfol io managemenl  services  provided  by banks.7
It  js  n  o\./  possible  to restate the 1egal  restrjctions  theory as a
set of five  interrelated propositions.S
(1)  Money  would  not exist as a distinctive  financial asset in
the absence  of  legal restrictjons;
(2)  The  unit of account  is  separable  from  the means  of payment;
(3)  Conventional  monetary  theories are applicable  only to a
specific set of financial 'i  nstjtutions;
(4)  In a laissez faire  system,  the provision  of payment  services
by banks  would  have  no special effects on prices or
mac  roeconom  i  c actjvjty;
(5)  The  provi  sion of payment  services  --  not the production  of
money  --  is the benchmark  for analyzing  banks.
In the next section, I  focus  on an implication of the 1ega1
restriction  theory, namely,  that a laissez fajre  system  would  be insulated
from  economic  fluctuations caused  by monetary  shocks.8
Economi  c Fl  uctuations
Some  writers have  suggested  that the problem  of economic
fl uctuations  would  be attenuated  if  not elimjnated  in an unregulated
banking  system. Greenfield  and  Yeager  (1983,  p.304)  contend  that such  a
system  rroffers  much  less scope  than an ordinary monetary  system  for
destructive  monetary  disequilibrium.rt They  also suggest  that runs  on
banks  rtwould  be less catastrophjc  under  Ithis]  system,r'  essential  ly
because  banks  would  exchange  liabilities  under  a floating rathen  than a
fi xed-rate  domestic  exchange  system.
Fama  (1980,  p. 40) offers the most  explicit  underpinning  for the
position that economic  fluctualions result from  regulatjons  compelling
banks  to play a special role "in  the process  by which  a pure nominal
commodity  or unit of account  is made  to play the role of numeraire  in a
real world monetary  system.  "9  He  argues  that money's  causal  inetficacy in
a laissez fajre  regime  can  best be understood  as an implicatjon of the
llodigliani-Miller theonem:  "...The portfol  io management  activitjes  are the
type of pure  financing  decisions  covered  by the Modigl  iani-Mjller  (1958)
theorem.  " 
10
The  core of Fama's  argument  is as follows.  Fjrst,  if  there is
competition,  then there are actual or potential substitutes for the
portfol  ios offered by any  banks. Second,  to attract  depositors,  banks
must  hold portfol  ios against  which  depositors  are willjng  to hold claims.
Third, competition  insures  that depositors  are paid a return equaling  that
earned  on the bankrs  portfol  io less a management  fee.  Gjven  that they areJ
pure  profit  maximizers,  the last assumption  renders  banks  jndifferent  to
the composition  of their  own  portfol  ios (Fama  [1980], pp. 45-46)
What  determines  the portfol  io composition  of banks? Both  the
financing and  the nature  of economic  activity  are determined  by "the
tastes and  endowments  of individual economic  units and  the state of the
economy's  technology  (Fama  [1980], p. 46).  In this  sense,  then, banks  are
passive  agents,  v/hose  portfol  ios are determined  by the nonfinancial
sect0r.
If  Famars  argument  is correct, however,  then banks  are passive  in
another  important  sense:  they exert no independent  force on prices or real
activjty  (Fama  [1980], p. 45).  The  quantity and  composition  of banks
assets  and  liabilities  are entirely demand  determ'i  ned.  If  one  bank  were
autonomously  to change  its  assets  and  liabilitjes,  competit'ion  would
insure offsetting  changes  by other banking  firms (Fama  119801  , p. 46).  In
the aggregate,  banks  would  thus play no causal  role  in the determination
of equilibrium  price and  quantity vectors.  This conciusion  is a
neutral  ity  finding writ  large.
In Fama's  analysis  at  least, a real good  functions  as the
numeraire. There  is  no  price level as such  to be  determined,  but only an
equi  I  ibrium price vector.  ldhat  would  be the question  of price-1evel
determination  reduces  to the issue of the stabil  ity  of equilibrium  in a
barter, general  equilibrium  system  (Fama  [1980],  p.44).  Consequently,
macroeconom'ic  phenomena  constituted by or attendant  upon  price-1eve1
fluctuations are absent  by assumption  in the competitive  banking
environment  posLulated  by B1ack,  Fama  and  Wal  lace.10
In Fama  (1980), the assumption  of a nonmonetary  econony  is a
modeling  strategy to isolate the essential functions of a competitjve
bank.  By  contrast, Greenfield  and  Yeager  (1983)  view  the abolition of
money  as an essential feature of a reform  (one  hesitates to say  "monetary
reformrr)  that they propose. In the process,  however,  they appear  to have
confused  an assumption  with a substantive  proof.
Greenfield  and  Yeager  (1983)  rely on the analysis of monetary
disequilibrium  presented  in Yeager  (1968).  Money  is unique  in having  no
market  of its  own. Accordingly,  an excess  demand  for money  must  be  worked
off  in all  other markets. St'icky  prices result jn quantity responses  and
pervasive  real effects of the initjal  excess  demand  for money  (Cf.
Greenfield  and  Yeager  [1983], p. 309).  In their analysis, Greenfield  and
Yeager  (1983,  p. 310) identify  the inelasticity  of the supply  of money  as
the necessary  condition for macroeconomic  disequil  ibrium to deve'lop  out of
an excess  demand  foruon"y.11  The  superiority of the proposed  system,
they assert, devolves  ar  ound  the demand  determinat'ion  of the means  of
payme  nt  .
Greenfjeld  and  Yeager  seem  to have  confused  themselves,  if  not
their  readers,  with thejr  argument  about  the demand  determinatjon  of the
means  of payment. They  point out that their  rrsystem  would  get rid  of any
distinct  money  existing in a definite  quantity....  A wrong  quantity of
money  could no longer  cause  problems  because  money  would  not existrl
(Greenfield  and  Yeager  [19S3],  p. 305).12 Simply  put, there is no
monetary  disequilibrium  in their  system  because  there is  not money! The
argument  about  the demand  determjnation  of the means  of payment,  which11
appears  to be a substantjve  proof, really  reduces  to a crude  approxjmation
of the kjnd of stability  analysis suggested  by Fama.  As  will  be seen,
however,  the Greenfield-Yeager  system  js  still  susceptible  to economic
disorders  similar in effects to that of monetary  disequiljbrjum.
Idhat.  then. of the substantive  issue of the existence  of economic
fluctuations in unregulated  bank.ing  system?  As already  mentioned,  the
problem  facing Greenfield  and  Yeager  is not that of price-1eve1
determination  but the attainment  of a general  equilibrium prjce vector.
Actual  ly,  it  would  be jnstructive to focus  on a more  basic question:  can
market  prices be determined  in the Greenfield-Yeager  system?
The  latteli  s the operative  question  because,  as Greenfield  and
Yeager  (1983,  p. 307)  clearly state, they are proposing  a barter system.
ltJith  no  money  quantitatively exist'ing, people  make
payments  by transferfling other property.  To buy a
bicycle priced at 100  value units on pay  a debt of
100  units,  one  transfers property  having  that total
vaiue.  Although  the...system  is banter  in that
sense,  it  is  not crude  barter.  People  need  not
haggle  over the partic-ular  goods  to be accepted  in
each  transaction.  The  profit  motive  wil  l  surely
lead  competing  private firms to offer  convenient
methods  of payme  nt.
First,  it  must  be noted  that there is  no other sense  in which  the
term  barte|i  s used  than to cover  situations in which  goods  trade directly
for goods.'"  Second,  I  know  of no theory  of 'rsophi  sticatedrr  barteri
Greenfjeld  and  Yeager  (1983)  does  not present  a theory of sophisticated
barter but depends  on the (nonexistent)  theory of how  such  a world
operates.  One  must  conclude  that they are talking of barter, pure  and
s.imple.!{
It  mjght  well be appropriate  to reconsider  the standard  ana)ysis
of barter.  Absent  a new  theory of barter, however,  one  must  be
pessimistic  concerning  the workableness  of the Greenf  ield-Yeageruyra"r.14
The  system  would  appear  to suffer from  the textbook  problems  of barter.
Although  Yeager  and  Greenfield  (1983,  p. 303)  really only assert the
contrary, the claim is worth  analyz'ing. They  admit  that the "system  would
indeed  lack money  as we  know  jt,'r  but they state that "it  would  not entail
the textbook  inconveniences  of barter.  The  advantages  of having  a
definite  unit of account  and  convenienL  methods  of payment  would  be
retained  and  enhanced."  The  implicit argument  is that it  is capitalism's
accounting  system,  not jts  payments  system  comprising  a physical  medium  of
exchange,  which  overcomes  the calculational difficulties  of barter.
A key  element  jn the Greenfield-Yeager  proposal  is the
government's  defining a unjt of va1ue,  which  would  then form  a basis of a
social accounting  system.l5 Rather  than  choosing  a single good  (as in
Famars  analys'i  s) or securities (as in Black's model  ),  Greenfjeld  and
Yeager  (1983,  p. 305) suggest  a composite  bundle  of commodities.l6
The  orices of the individual commodities  would  not
be fixed and  would  remain  free to vary in relation
to one  another. 0nly the bundle  as a whole  wou1d,
by definition,  have  the fixed price of 1 unit....
The  bundle  would  be composed  of precisely gradable,
competitjvely  traded, and  industrjal  ly  important
commodities,  and  in amounts  conresponding  to their
relatjve importance. Many  would  be the materials
used  in the production  of a wide  range  of goods  so
that the bundle  as the value unit would  come  close
to stabjlizing the general  level of prices
ex  pre  s  sed in that uni  t.1J
Greenfield  and  Yeager  (1983,  pp. 303, 306)  emphasize  the
differences bet\,reen  their  proposal  and  those  for a compo  s  i  te-commod  i  ty or
commodity-reserve  monetary  system. No  reserves  of the composite  bundle
would  be maintained  by any  agency  or private entity.  There  is no
convertjbility  but only a defined  unit of value.  The  latter  distinction  is
important  to the authors  as well as to the reader  assessing  their  proposal.
There  is a striking  similarity  between  the logic of the trading
process  'in lhe Greenf  iel  d-Yeager  proposal  and  that in early Marxist schemes
for allocating and  distributing goods. It  is instructiVe to draw  the
paralle1s, since  doing  so helps  isolate a critical  flaw in Greenfield  and
Yeager  (  1983  )  .
Marxrs  overriding economic  goal  was  to replace  capital  ism's
"anarchicrr  system  of production  with a system  of conscious  social control
of the means  of production  (Lavoie  t1985]).  Marx  wanted  to avoid any
reliance on market  pnices  in allocating resources  and  djstribuling  goods.
He  suggested  using labor tjme as a measure  of the cost (value) of each
commodity  and  actual  ly exchanging  goods  according  to theiI  embodjed  labor
t'ime.  Compare  Greenfield  and  Yeager  (1983,  p. 307), who  observe  that "to
buy  a bicycle priced at.  100  value units or pay  a debt of 100  un.its,  one
transfers property  having  that total  value.rl
Using  labor time as a mechan'ism  for allocaLing  resounces  founders
on the problem  of laborrs heterogeneity  and  nonuniformity. Marx  tfljed to
reduce  heterogeneousr  skilled  labor to homogeneous,  unskilled labor time.
He  did not, however, solve the valuation problem. A competitive  market14
evaluates  different  types of labor but Marx  wanted  to eschew  the use  of
anarchic  market  values.  This ieft  hjm  with analytjcal  ly  insoluble  problem
of evaluating  heterogeneous  labor without an evaluation  mechanism  (Lavoie
[1e8s]  ,  pp. 67-74)  .
Greenfield  and  Yeager  face the even  more  complex  problem  of
homogenizing  the heterogeneous  commodities  of their  composite  numeraire.
Greenfield  and  Yeager  (1983,  pp. 313-14)  mention  but do not solve the
calcul  ationa  l probl  em.
Suppose  that the ...  bundle  were  defined  as 1
apple  + 1 banana  + I cherry.  Prjces are to be paid
and  debts settled in bundles-worth  of convenient
payment  property.  Now  apples  are struck by a
fungus.  What  market  forces arise to accompl  i  sh the
appropriate  changes  in relative prices while still
enforci  ng the unit's  defjnitjon?r/
Greenfjeld  and  Yeagen  (1983,  pp. 313-14)  are, as it  were,  hoist on
their  own  petard.  They  themselves  note that jf  a fungus  atlacks apples,
the bundle  becomes  relatively  scarcer;  deflatjonary pressure  is exerted  on
other commodjtjes.  This is  the evjl  from  which  their  nonmonetary  exchange
system  was  to save  us.  They  suggest  that bananas  and  cherrjes are among
the commoditjes  whose  relative price will  fall.  The  need  for an adjustment
of the prjces of other commodities  withjn the bundle  adds  to the adjustment
problem  rather than (partiaily)  offsetting iL.  In general  , there  will  be
more  not fewer  price changes  necessary  because  there are two additional
composite  goods  whose  prices have  changed,15
In taking account  of the effects of the fungus  attack, Greenfield
and  Yeager  (1985,  p. 314) suggest  widening  the definitjon  of the bundle.
indeed,  they indicate that the wider the defjnition,  the better the
results.  Consider,  however,  what  wouid  occulif  the suggestion  were
carrjed to its  logical extreme. Every  trade would  constitute an exchange
against  a representative  bundle  of all  commodjties.  Using  a conventional
medium  of exchange  ("money,"  as we  now  know  it)  avoids  having  to calculate
n-1 relative  prices in making  individual exchanges  The  method  of payment  jn
the Greenfield-Yeager  system  would  require just  this  exercj  se for each  and
every  transactjon.  Their system  would  accordingly  involve the
cal  cul  ati  onal chaos  of barter.
To give some  hi  s  t  o  r  i  c  a  I  -  i  n  s  !  i  t  u  t  'j  o  n  a  I  rel  evance  to the argument,
the authors  have  observed  that changes  in the relative scarcity of gold
under  a gold standard  produces  familiar macroeconomic  consequences.  They
suggest  not a bimetalI  ic but a trjmetallic  system  as an improvement,
ignoring  the additional problems  introduced  by the possibiljly  of
re'lative-price changes  between  goods  in the composite  bundle.18
Actual1y,  the analytica'l  problem  being  discussed  is inherent  in
any scheme  to stabilize a price level or other constructed  average  price.
The  appeal  of stabilizing a price level or subset  of prices is that doing
so  wjll  somehow  minimize  or djmjnish  the number  of re'lative-price  changes
necessary  in a market  economy  (cf.  Friedman  [1969], p. 106).  To  my
knowledge  no one  has  ever demonstrated  this  rigorously; Greenfield  and
Yeager  certainly do not do ro.19  They  in fact have  done  us the service of
inadvertently showing  why  stabilizing a price or subset  of prices would  notLb
necessarj  ly diminish  the costly market  adjustments  necessary  in a monetary
economy.  Greenfield  and  Yeager  have  surely faijed,  however,  to demonstrate
their main  practjcal point, that economic  fluctuations would  be eliminated
in a nonmonetary  system. In a sense,  this  is gratifying,  since it  would  be
counter-intuitive to hold that a nonmonetary  sysLem  is more  efficient  than
a monetary  economy.
Whether  economic  fluctuations would  occur  in an economy  with
unregulated  banks  remains  an open  question.  Resolution  of the question
wou'ld  require both a fuller  development  of the legal restrict'ions theory
and  careful specification of the sources  of cyclical disturbances. l'lodel  s
of the business  cycle increasingly  identify  real factors as the cause  of
fluctuations.  If  these  models  are correct, lhen it  is unciear  what  effect
monetary  deregulation  would  have  on the timing, ampl  itude on frequency  of
cycl  ical  fl uctuati  ons.
Suppose,  however,  that economic  fluctuations are caused  by
monetary  shocks. It  would  still  be unclear  whether  we  could be confident
that an unrestricted banking  system  would  eljmjnate lhese  fluctuations.
The  uncertainty  devolves  on the issue of bank  reserves  and  interbank
deposits.  The  I  iterature on the legai restrictjons theory has  little  to
say  about  settlement  practices for banks  (financial  intermediaries)  in a
deregulated  environment.  Yet the jssue is crucjal,  since  two banks  can
only settle their  liabilities  by transferfling  a third asset, which  is the
I  iabil ity  of neither bank.20 To facj  I  itate  settlement,  banks  may  hold
interbank  deposits.  More  generally, howeven,  banks  wjll  hold reserves  of
some  asset  acceptable  to all  as fjnal  settlement.  Today,  base  moneyt/
(deposits  at Federal  Reserve  banks  pius currency)  constjtutes the reserve
asset.  Even  absent  1ega1  restrictions,  there would  be a finite  demand  for
a reserve  asset; agajn, the source  of the demand  would  derjve from  the
requirements  of the interbank  c'learing  p"0."rr.21  Indeed,  these
considerations  lead  0sborne  (1985b)  to conclude  that banks  would  hold
reserves  even  in a laissez fajre  payments  system. The  optimal reserve
ratio would  be much  closer to zero, however,  than to one,  which  exposes  the
system  to the periodic crises inherent in a fractional-neserve  banking
system. 0sborne  (1985b,  pp. 22-23)  concludes  as follows.
It  is hard  to imagine  that such  a system  could
produce  most  of the uncertainties and  absurdities
lhat drjve observers  of our present  system  to
despair...  . But the speculations  do not suggest
that it  would  be free of monetary  disturbances.
The  bankers  of a free system  would  choose  their
reserve  ratios as profit  dictates.  The  optimal
reserve  ratio would  be less than one.  There  would
be furtive  abundance,  and  it  would  vanish  with the
gusts  of djscredit that would  blow  among  a free
people  as among  others, even  if  less often.18
Barren llon  ey
In this  section, I concentrate  on the assumptjons  of the legal
restrictions theory.  Bryant  and  ldallace  (1980,  p. 1) provide  the most
explicit  statement  of the underlying  assumptions.
(1) Assets  are valued  only in terms  of their  payoff
di  str  i  buti  ons.
(2) Anticipated payoff dj  stributions are the same
as actual payoff di  stributions.
(3) Under  laissez-faire, no transaction  costs 'i  nhibit Lhe  operation  of markets  and, in
particular,  the law  of one  price.
Simply  stated, the 1ega1  restrictions theory assumes  away  the
exi  stence  of any  nonpecuniary  yield  from  holding noney.22  Since  at least
currency  yields no  explicit  return, this quickly leaves  us with no reason
for  ratjonal economic  agents  to demand  the asset.  Any  neoclassical
economist  worth  his salt  should  be unsatisfied  with this  situation and
quickly stnive to identify the intervent'ion  generating  this  otherwise  odd
situation.  In terms  of their own  assumptions,  Bryant  and  VJal  lace, et a1.,
have  done  a good  job of modeling  the problem. The  assumptions  must  not go
unchal'lenged,  howeve  r  .
The  denial of a nonpecuniary  yield  to money  is really  another  way
of stating the old view  that money  is  "barren."  In an undeservedly
neglected  essay,  Hutt (1956)  surveyed  the histony of monetary  economics  and
could find only one  orthodox  monetary  theorj  st (Greidanus)  who  was  not, to
one  degree  or another,  under  the sway  of the doctrine that money  is barren.
Though  many  economists  have  had  all  the elements  of a correct theory --19
clearly perceiving  that money  provides  convenjences  services  and  cost
savings  --  virtually  ali  continued  to assume  explicitly  that moneyrs  yield
is,  in Keynesr  words,  nil"  (Keynes  [1936], p. 226).
The  view  that money  yields no return is as old as Arjstotle.  Ir
entered  modern  economics  through  the schoolmen,  thence  via Locke  and  Adam
Smjth.  Not surprisingly, Hutt traces the idea thnough  the classical
economists.  l,rlhat  is  surprising, however,  are the illustrious  neoclassical
economists  who  have  echoed  the point down  to the present.  ldhereas  Locke
said that "money  is  a banren  thing" (Hutt [1956], p. 199), Bohm-Bawerk
assured  us that:  rrMoney  is by nature incapable  of bearing  fruit"  (Hutt
[1955], p. 203).  \rlicksell  described  money  as ,,sterilerr  (Hutt [1956], p.
204).
Perhaps  the most  puzzling  of all  is Keynes. I've already  quoted
him  as denying  that money  has  a yie'ld.  Thjs statement  js the more
remarkable,  since it  appears  in the section  of the General  Theory  in which
Keynes  analyzes  the liquidity  premium  on money. If  we  take him  1itera11y,
then economic  agents  exhibit a preference  for an asset  tr,ith  no  yield.23
The  confusion  is even  clearer jn Marshal  I  than in Keynes.
Marshal  l  expl  icitly  recognized  that some  capital assets  yield an impl  icit
or nonpecun'iary  return but denied  that money  is  one  of these  assets.  He
averred  that holding resources  in the form  of money  rrlocks  up in a barrer,
form  resources  that mjght  yieid an income  of gratification  if  invested,
say, in extra furniture;  or a money  income  jf  invested  in extra machinery
or cattlerr  (Hutt [1956], pp. 205-06).20
Marshal  I was  quite modern  --  more  so even  lhan Keynes  --  in noting
that the yield  on an asset  can  be either nonpecuniary  or pecuniary.  He
simply  denied  that money  has  a yield  of either kind.  I  submjt  that modern
treatments  of the demand  for money  make  essentially the same  mistake.  The
modern  I  iteralure  is quite clear in treating foregone  interest as the cost
of holding  money,  bul is more  ambiguous  by far on the benefits derived from
cash  holdings.  Foliowing  Baumol,  one  traditjon  focuses  on brokerage  costs
of moving  jn and  out of interest-bearing  assets.  This explanation  rings
hollow  as we  return to a financial system  with sophisticated  financial
instruments  and  cash  management  techniques. Following  Tobin, a second
ljterature  focuses  on f iquidity preference  as behavior  tov{ard  rjsk.  The
latter  tradition  perhaps  adheres  more  closely to Keynes,  but, in so doing,
perpetuates  his error on the yield  from  holding  money.
Hutt contends  that modern  monetary  theory perpetuates  an 18th
century  view  of productivity.  The  18th  century  vjew  treats productivity in
entjrely physical  terms:  an asset is productive  if  it  yields a return in
kind, i.e.,  if  it  bears  frujt.  If  it  yie'lds no fruit,  the asset  is barren.
Since  money  traditional1y yielded no interest,  18th  century  economi  sts
viewed  it  as barren.  Modern  capital lheory has  moved  beyond  that view  by
accepting  that assets  can  yield an implicit  return.  This insight explains,
for example,  the holding  of so-called  idle  land.24
When  it  comes  torridle  balances,rr  however,  the 18th  century  vjev{
hoids sway. As suggested  above,  the neoclassical  spirit  is restive when
confronted  w'ith  a demand  for an asset  apparently  having  no  yield.  The
restive spi  rit  has  yielded the 1egal  restrictions theory.  Indeed,  so longL!
as economists  adhere  to the 18th century  Viel/{  on money,  the legal
restrictions  theory  may  be the only consistent resolutjon of the conundrum.
Money  yields a nonpecuniary  return, just  as does  furniture,  a
pajnting or wine  coilection.  In deciding  whether-  to hold more  or less
money,  an indivjdual compares  the advantages  of holding  the money  balances
with the advantages  of holding  othen  assets.  In doing  this,  the indjvidual
is comparing  different  expected  yields;  he is  not compani  ng an asset
yielding a return with one  yielding no return.  The  latter  wou1d,  indeed,
be a paradoxi  cal sjtuation.
0nce  we  accept  that money  yields a nonpecuniary  return, the
paradox  identified by the 1ega1  restrictions  theory is  seen  to be apparent
rather than real  .  In other words,  the paradox  is  resolved  by denying  the
thesis.  Along  the way,  we  also manage  to jettjson  a good  deal of
phiiosophical  baggage  that \^/e  can  do  well without.25
What  I  am  identifying js a property  of money  that  is the property
neithen  of legal restrictions  nor of hi  storical accident, but which
reflects a preference  exhibited  by jndjvjduals over tjme and  in radically
different  trading environments.  The  property  or characteristic is money's
liquidity.
Hicks  (1974,  pp. 38-39)  has succinctly characterized  the demand
for liquidity  as a desire for flexjbility:  rrLiquidity  is not a property  of
a single choice; it  is a matter  of a sequence  of choices,  a related
sequence.  It  is concerned  wjth the passage  from  the known  to the unknown
--  with the knowledge  that if  we  wait we  can  have  more  knowledge.rr  In
contrast, Hicks  (1974,  pp. 43-44)  pojnts out that rrby  holding  the22
imperfectly  liquid  asset the holder has  narrowed  the trend of opportunities
which  may  be open  to hjm....  He  has rlocked  hjmself jn.r"  In so
characterizing  the value  of liquidity  to t,ransactors,  Hicks  clearly links
the demand  for money  (and  other 
'l 
iquid assets)  to uncertainty.  In this
sense,  money  can  only be analyzed  with a theory incorporating
uncertainty.26
Money  is not merely  highly liquid,  but that asset  which  is
perfectly liquid.  It  trades in every  market  and  need  never  be sold at a
,7
discount.''  Even  highly liquid,  nonmonetary  assets  are subject  to price
ri sk.  For this  reason!  people  are w'i  lling  to forego  substantial pecuniary
returns in order to hold money  baiances. In highly regulated  and
substanti  al  1y unregul  ated monetary  systems  al  i  ke, i  ndi  vidual  s have  demanded
absol  utely I  i  quid assets.
The  above  addresses  the demand  for  liquidity.  The  1ega1
restrictions  theori  sts may  be interpreted as emphasizing  a supply  issue:
why  cannot  intermediaries  purchase  interest-bearing  assets  and  issue
circulating notes  ("currencyrr)  backed  by these  assets? It  is certainly
true that the willingness of people  to forego  a pecuniany  neturn  does  not
imply that  they need  do so.  As Bryant  and  lrjallace  (1980,  p. 11) insist,
we  must  investigate the rrtransaction  technology"  in a modern  economy.
Bryant  and  lllallace  (1980,  pp. 14-15)  and  V/allace  (1983,  p. 3)
estimate  the costs of intermediating  by observing  the spread  between  the
rates of return earned  and  paid by mutua)  funds.  |.ial  lace (1983,  pp. 3-4)
asserts  that rr  there js no reason  to expect  that the cost of intermediating
securities like Treasury  bills  into bearer  notes  would  be much  different23
from  the cost of operati  ng these  i  ntermedj  arj  es,'r  0bservati  on suggests,
however,  that there is good  reason  to suppose  a great deal of difference
between  the costs of suppling  low-turnover  deposits  (money  market  mutual
fund shares)  and  high-turnover  currency. ldhite  (1985)  examines  the
t  r  a  n  s  a  c  t  i  o  n  -  c  o  s  t  structure and  concl  udes  that the'i ntermedi  at  ion costs for
currency  are of an entirely different  or-der  of magnitude  than for deposits.
He  offers three types  of evidence:  (1) historical  evidence  on currency
issued  in the Scottish free-banking  system;  (2) evidence  current practice
with respect  to travelers checks;  and  (3) an a priori  estimate.
With respect  to the fjrst  type of evidence,  White  (1985,  pp. 3-4)
observes  that rrthe  legal restrictions theory provides  us wjth a clear anc
falsifiable  prediction: non-interest  yielding currency  should  not coexist
w'ith  positive-interest-yjelding securities in the absence  of 1ega1
restrjctions against  the sort of intermediation  that could produce
interest-yielding bearer  bonds  backed  by those  same  securjties.r'  In the
free-banking  era (i.e.,  before 1844)  Scottish banks  had  complete  freedom  to
pay interest on bank  notes  and  the banking  environment  was  competitjve,
Yet noninterest-bearing  currency  flourished, falsifying  the predjctjon of
the 1ega1  restrj  cti ons  theory.
Second,  h/hite  (1985,  p. 4) notes  the nonpayment  of  interest on
travelers checks  today.  Moreover,  it  would  surely be computational  ly
easier to pay  interest on travelers checks  than on currency.  There  appear
to be no restrictions on paying  interest on travelers checks.
White's  third  piece  of evidence  is perhaps  the most  jnteresting.
He  adduces  arguments  v{hy  interest-bearing  currency  would  inherently be rnore24
costly to transact  with than noninteresting-beafling  currency.  He  then
makes  a reasonable  calcuiation of the costs of coilecting the jnterest
accrued  on a note and  concludes  that jt  would  be prohibitive (|'/hite  11985],
pp. 7-10)
Both  theoretical arguments  and  obsenvational  evidence  suggest  that
there was  never  a paradox  to explain.  It  is certainly tnue that the
existing financial system  is replete with reguiations.  Some  of these
negulations  would  even  serve  to restrajn an issuer from  circulating
'interest-bearing  currency  if  he  wanted  to do so.  The  evidence  indicates,
however,  that the restraints are irrelevant.  Interest-bearing  currency
would  not plausibly evolve  wjth reasonable  assumptions  made  about  costs and
benefits.  It  has  not existed  when  banks  were  free to issue it.  it  will
probably  not exist when  banks  are free to issue it  aqajn in the future.Concl  us  ion
In the previous  section, White's  analys'i  s addressed  the
supply-side  or cost considerations  adduced  by Bryant  and  Wallace. At least
for argument's  sake,  the analysis  accepts  the plausibility  of currency's
yielding jnterest.  At minimum,  however,  the interest earned  on money  must
always  be less than that earned  on nonmoney  assets.  For if  money  were  to
yield both  a nonpecuniary  neturn  of liquidity  services  and  an explicit
market  rate of interest,  then the return on holding  money  would  be
supra-normal  .  Osborne  (1984  and  1985a)  argued  that base  money  alone
corresponds  to t.he  money  of economic  theory.  It  wou'ld  be plausible to
suppose  then that currency  would  be the most  liquid  transactions  money.
Its  lack of an explicjt  yie.ld  scarcely  seems  troublesome  in that light.
One  can, of course,  deny  (as Bryant  and  Wa1  lace [1980]  did) that
there 'i  s a distinctive  asset  called money. In their  case,  the denial
rea11y  is an impljcation of a methodological  argument  about  the form  that
economic  reasoning  ought  take.  it  ciear'ly is beyond  the scope  of thjs
paper  to deal directly  with that debate.28 It  would  be unfortunate,
however,  if  the debate  over banking  deregulation  became  entangled  in a
modern  methodenstreit. More  concretely, commitment  to (or against) banking
deregulation  does  not presume  commitment  to the equi  I  ibrium theorizing
advocated  by the 1ega1  restrictions theori  sts.  Indeed,  historically
unregulated  banking  has  born Iittle  resemblance  to the hypothetical
"laissez-faire"  systems  postulated  in various  model  s derived from  the legal
restrjct'ions theory.  In that sense,  the theory is a detour jn the debate
over banki  nq  derequl  ati  on  .26
From  a different  perspective,  however,  the legal restrictions
theory has  done  a great service  by challenging  economists  to rethjnk their
commitment  to monetary  regulation.  0n their own  terms, conventional
macroeconomic  model  s make  no sense. lrial  lace (1983,  p. 6) correctly
identifies  that,  on convenLional  grounds,  the one  remaining  justification
for  1ega1  restrictions on money  js revenue  coilection.  If  economists
pursue  the suggestion  of modeling  legal restrictions  on  money  as a species
of fiscal  policy, then the legal restrictions theorists will  have  made  a
I  asti  ng contrj  buti  on.27
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1.  Although  I  r"efer  to the 1ega1  restrictions theory as the rrnew  view,r'
Cowen  and  Krosner  (1985)  argue  that theory is anything  but new. They
contend  that it  has  a long histony, which  begins  in the eighteenth
centuny.
2.  A "bondrr  refers to a dated  i  nterest-beari  ng  ob1  i  gati  on, whi  1e
"currency"  refers to a noninterest-bearjng  note callable on demand.
3.
4.
0r, as  Hall (1982b,  p. 1554)  puts  it,
regu'l  ation.rr The  following  discussion
from  0rDriscoll  (1985a,  pp. 6-7).
rrmoney  is exactly a creature  of




ldallace  (1983,  pp. 1n) refers the reader  to Fama  (1980)  and  Hall (1982)
I'for other discussions  of the 1ega1  restrictions theory."  He  also
cites six other articles  as app'l  ications of the theory, but does  not
refer to Black  (Wa11ace  [1983], p. 3).  Black is clearly the 'i  ntellectual predecessor,  however,  of Fama,  Ha11,  biallace,  et a1  .
Black  does  not adhere  strictly  to a laissez faire  assumption. For
instance, he specifies that 'revery  bank  wjl'l be required  to have
capjtal equal  to a certain fraction of its  loans..."  (Black 11970],  p.
12)  .  Hi  s support  of capi  ta1 requj  rements  i  s parti  cul  arly odd, gi  ven
his opposition  to reserve  requi  rements.
Black  later adds  that rrneither  the quantity theory of money  nor the
liquidity  preference  theory  of money  would  be applicable.rr And  he
further states that:  rrTraditional  monetary  theoflies  will  be
inapplicable; in fact,  it  will  not be possible  to define the quantjty
of money  i  n mean  ingful terms  (  B1ack  [  1970]  , pp. 9-10).
In a footnote  to thjs  passage,  lliallace  adds  that:  I'The  result that
central bank  intermediation  does  not matter under  laissez-faire aiso
holds for central bank  exchange  of Federal  Reserve  notes  for other
assets  --  risky mortgages,  risky commercial  loans, or common  stock.  It
is  a straightforward  extension  of a wel  l-known  finding in corporate
finance  called the Modigliani-Miller theorem." 0n the latter  point,
see Fama  (  1980, pp. 45-47)  .
Cowen  and  Krosner  (1985,  pp. 2-3) adduce  7 propositions  characterizing
the theory.
8.28
9.  Yeager  and  Greenfield  (1983)  offer  their  own  analysis of the problem,
whi  ch I examine  below.
10. Fama  (1980,  p. a0).  Fama  (i980, pp. 45-47)  offers rwo  varjanrs  of the
theorem. Wood  and  hiood  (1985,  pp. 477-82)  offer a textbook
presentat  ion of the theorem.
11. 0n the crucial role of the supply  elasticjty
[1e36]  , pp. 234-36).
12. 0r see  Yeager  and  Greenfield  (1980,  p. 303)
their  system  rrwould  indeed  lack money  as we
of money,  Cf. Keynes  (1964
, where  they state that
know  it..."
13. See  Clower  (1970), pp. 202-277. Clower  (pp. 207-08)  srares  rhe
foliowing as "the central theme  of the theory of a money  economy":
"Money  buys  goods  and  goods  buy  money;  but qoods  do not buy  goods.,' By
contrast, in Greenfield  and  Yeager  (1983),  goods  buy  goods.
14. OrDriscoll (1983)  offers a more  detailed critique of an earlier
presentation  of the 1ega1  restfictions  theory by Yeager  (1983).
15. Government  plays an ironic role in many  of the I'laj  ssez-fairerr  model  s
of the payments  mechanism.  In Greenfield  and  Yeager  (i983), government
4efines  the unit of value.  In llallace (1983),  government  jmposes
la'issez  faire.  In Hall (1982a),  government  replaces  the existing
rnonetarv  standard  by fiai  and 
"ngiges 
in jnterest-rate targetingi  The
use  of "laissez-fairefi in this  ciais of model  s aDDears  to be a 
-
neo'logi  sm.
16. Greenfield  and  Yeager  (1983,  p. 305)  cite  Robert  Hallrs suggestion  of a
bundle  of 50 ki  lognams  of ammonium  nitrate  plus 40 kilograms  of copper
plus 35 ki'iograms  of aluminum  plus 80 square  meters  of plywood  (of
specified grade), but indicate a preference  for an even  more
encompassi  ng  compo  s  i  te bundl  e,
17. The  authors  invjte  misunderstanding  by such  phrases  as t'enforcing  the
unitrs definition.rr  Greenfield  and  Yeager  (1983,  p. 303)  have  assured
us that the I'unit of account  does  not require I  i  mp  I  ementat  i  on  I through
convertibi  lity  of any  famjl  iar sort, anymore  than does  maintenance  of
the defined length of the meter.rr What,  then, is to be enforced?
18. Greenfield  and  Yeager  have,  of course,  designated  their  system  as
nonmonetary.  I  am  not arguing, therefore, that it  would  be similar jn
all  respects  to a trimetallic  sysLem,  but am  only suggest'i  ng that it
would  involve the theoretical and  practical prob'lems  di  scussed  here.
19. Ual  lace (  1983,  p. 6) observes  that:
...Ther"e  exist no complete  argument,s  leading  to the
conclusion  that people  are on average  beLter  off
the more  stable the price 1eve1,  qiven  the steps29
that have  to be taken  to attain greater stability
of the price level  .  0n the contrary, as Sargent
and  |rlal  lace (1982)  argue,  the restrictions that
make  greater  price 1eve1  stabiljty  possible  hurt
some  people  and  benefit others, while on average, 'in  a certain sense,  making  all  worse  off."
He  concludes  that, without 1ega1  r"estrictions, rrit is  no easier to
achieve  price 1eve1  stabil  ity  than it  is to achieve  stability  of some
rel  ati  ve pri  ce.  "
20. 0rDriscoll (1985,  pp. 7-9) examines  this  issue jn more  detaii;  cf.
0sborne  (  1985,  pp. 18-23)  .
21. Recent  historiography  on the clearinghouse  function in a free-banking
system  includes  Gorton  (1985)  and  Timberlake  (1984).
White  (1984a,  pp. 1-22) presents  a model  of free banking  in which
ban  ks demand  reserves.
22. Cf. Whit.e  (1985,  p. 5). The  first  assumptjon  explicitly  precludes  a
nonpecuniary  yield  on  money. But the second  and  third  assumptions
separateiy  exclude  the possibility,  since  the eljminate the reason  for
moneyrs  yield.  (See  the textual discussion,  infra.)
23. Keynes'  point was  precisely that money  yjelds a nonpecuniary  yield.
That he felt  compel  led to say  that moneyrs  yield  is  "df"  indicates,
however,  that the old view  of barren  money  still  held sway  over him
even  as he  was  engaged  in trying to overturn jt.  As Keynes  sajd in the
Preface  to the General  Theory,  rrthe  difficulty  1ies, not in the new
ideas, but 'in esc'aping  trom  tfre  o1d  ones,  which, ramify, for those
brought  up  as most  of us have  been,  into every  corner of our minds."
24. And  it  can  serve  to explain  the holding  of idle resources  generally.
For an insightful analysis  along  these  lines , see  Hutt (1939).
25.One also avoids  having  to adopt  the troublesome  model  ing strategy
adopted  in Bryant  and  ltJallace  (1980).  Bryant  and  Wallace  (1980,  p. 6)
defend  the strategy by arguing  that "the reader  js  not giving up  much
by entertaining fthe three] postulates  as a potential basjs for a
theory of financial  systems. By not gjving up  much,  we  mean  that
exist'ing  alternative model  s of financial  systems  have  taught us very
ljttle.rr  I am  inclined to agree  that we  would  not be giving up  much  by
jettison'ing the macroeconomic  model  s examined  by Bryant  and  lria  l lace
(1980,  pp. 6-10).  I  try  to indicate this on p. 21, supra.  0'Driscoll
(1985b)  discusses  the origins of the tradition  presented  here.  A1  so,
see  OrDriscoll  and  Rizzo  (1985,  pp. 191-98).
26. The  latter  point is  scarcely  original  .  If  accepted,  however,  it
precludes  the strategy  adopted  by Bryant  and  lriallace  (1980).
0'Driscoll and  Rizzo  (1985)  argue  that uncertainty  is the source  of
many  economic  processes  and  jnstitutions,  which  can  be analyzed  only by30
'i  ncorporating  uncertajnty.  Money  is,  in fact,  one  of the best examples
of a market  institution  that would  not exjst in a world with perfect
foresight and  no transaction  costs.  At this  levei of genenal  ity,
Bryant  and  l{allace  (1980)  had  their  chief result as soon  as they wrote
down  thei  r assumptions.
The  analysis  of liquidity  draws  on  0'Driscoll  (1985a,  p. 11).
27. This characterization  takes  not names  but properties  seriously (see
Bryant  and  l.Jallace  [1980], pp. 8-9).  Choosing  the empirical
counterpart  of the Lheoretical  construct is not an easy  task, as
Osborne  (1984  and  1985a)  demonstrates.
28. The  issue is taken  up in great detaiI  in 0rDriscoll and  Rizzo  (1985).3i
B  IBLiOGRAPHY
Black,  Fischer. rrBanking  and  Interest  Rates  in a World  hlithout  lloney."
Journal of Bank  Research  1 (Autumn  1970):  9-20.
Bryant, John  and  Wa11ace,  Nei  1  .  I'The  Inefficiency of Interest-bearjng
Nationa'l  Debt.rr Journal  of Pol  itical  Economy  87 (Apri1 1979):  365-81.
Bryant,  John  and  Wallace,  Neil.  "A Suggestion  for Further  Simplifying  the
Theory  of Money." l'4inneapol  js:  Photocopy,  1980.
Clower,  Robert  W., ed. l4onetary  Theory:  Selected  Readings. Baltimore:
Pengui  n, 1969.
Cowen,  Tyler and  Krosner,  Randy. "The  Development  of the Legal
Restrjctjons Theory  of Money.  "  (Cambridge,  l'4A: Photocopy,  1985).
Fama,  Eugene. rrBanking  in the Theory  of Finance.'r  Journal  of Monetary
Economics  6 (January  1980):  39-57.
Friedman,  Mjlton.  The  Optimum  Quantity  of Money. Chicago: Aldine, 1969.
Gorton,  Gary.  '  '  C  1  e  a  r  i  n  g  h  o  u  s  e  s and  the 0ri  gi  n of Central  Banking  in the
United  States.rr Journal  of Economic  History 45 (June  1985):  277'83.
Greenfield, Robert  L. and  Yeager,  Leiand  B.  'rA  Laissez-Faire  Approach  to
Monetary  Stability."  Journal of Money,  Credjt and  Bankjng  15  (August
1983)  :  302-15.
Hal  I , Robert  E.  rrExplorations  jn the Gold  Standard  and  Related  Pol  icies
for Stabilizing the Dollar." In Inflation:  Causes  and  Effects, pp.
777-22.  Chicago  University of Chicago  PressJ982a.
Rev  i  ew
Journal
"Monetary  Trends  in the United  States  and  the United  Kingdom:  A
from  the Perspective  of New  Developments  in Monetary  Economics."
of Economic  Literature 20 (December  1982b): 1552-56.
Hicks,  J.R.  The  Crisis in Keynesian  Economjcs.  New  York: Basic  Books,
1974.
Hutt, ld.H. The  Theory  of Idle Resources.  (1939).
"The  Yield from  Money  Held.rr In 0n Freedom  andFree
796-2?3.  Edited
by Mary  Sennholz. Princelon:  D. Van  Nostrand,  1956.
Keynes,  John  l,laynard.  The  General  Theory  of Employment,  Interest, and
Money. New  York:  Harcourt,  Brace  & |,'lo11d,  Harbinger  Books,  1964
(  1e36).32
Kl  ei  n, Benjami  n.  "The  Competi  ti ve Suppiy  of Floney.  "  Journal of Money,
Credjt, and  Banking  6 (November  1974):
Lavoie,  Don.  Rivalry and  Central  Planning: The  Socialist Calculation
Debate  Reconsidered.  Cambridge,  U.K.:  Cambridge  University Press,
1385:-
0'Driscoll,  Gerald  P.  "A Free-Market  Money: Comment  on Yeager.rr  Cato
Journal  3 (Spring 1983):  327-33.
"Money  in a Deregulated  Financial System.rr  Federal  Reserve
Bank  of Oallas Economic  Review  (May  1985a): I-72.
"l'loney: Menger's  Evolutionary  Theory."  Federal  Reserve  Bank
of Dallas Research  Paper  No. 8508  (1985b);  forthcoming,  History of
Pol  itical  Economy  (1986).
0sbonne,  Dale  K.  rrTen  Approaches  to the Definition of Money.rr  Federal
Reserve  Bank  of Dallas Economic  Review  (l4arch  1984):  1-23.
"hlhat  is Money  Today?" Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Dallas
Economic  Review  (January  1985a): 1-15.
.  "0n the Theory  of Laj  ssez-Fai  re Payments  Systems.rr  Dal  I  as: --- 
PhotoEopy,  1985b.
Sargent,  Thomas  J.  and  Wal  l  ace, Nei  l .  "The  Real  -bj  l  l  s Doctr"i  ne versus  the
Quantity  Theory: A Reconsideration.r'  Journal  of Pol  itical  Economy  90
(  December  1982):  7272-36.
Timbenlake,  Jr.,  Richard  H.  "The  Central  Banking  Role  of Clearinghouse
Associations.r'  Journal  of Money,  Credit and  Banking  16 (February
1984)  :  1-15.
ila1lace,  Ne'i  1.  "A Legal  Restrictions Theory  of the Demand  for rrlYoney'r  and
the Role  of Monetary  Policy.rr  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Minneapolis
Qua  rte  r]y  Rev  i  ew (  Wi  n  te  r  1983  )  :  l-7 .
l{hite, Lawrence  H.  Free  Banking  jn Britain:  Theory,  Experience,  and
Debate,  1800-1845.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University Press, 1984a.
rrCompetitive  Payments  Systems  and  the Unit of Account.
Ameri  can Economi  c Rev  i  ew  74 (  September  1984b)  :  699-712.
'rAccounting  for Non-'interest-bearing  Currency:  A Critique of
the 'Lega1  Restrictionsr Theory  of Money.rr  New  York: Photocopy,  1985.
l{ood,  John  H. and  lrlood,  Norma  L.  Fjnancjal  lvlarkets. New  York:  Harcourt
Brace  Jovanovi  ch, 1985.Yeager,  Lel  and
Kyklos  21
B.  rrEssential
(  1968)  :  4s-69.
J5
Properties  of
Repri  nted i  n
the Medi  um  of Exchange."
Cl  ower  (  1969),  pp. 37-60.